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The	Great	Recession	has	revived	interest	in	the	question	of	the	optimal	exchange	rate	
regime.	This	debate	is	of	immense	practical	importance:	we	argue	that	the	exchange	
rate	regime	may	be	a	key	element	in	explaining	the	different	experiences	of	the	
Scandinavian	countries	in	the	Great	Recession	and	their	recovery	experience	
thereafter.	The	recent	literature	has	shown	that,	according	to	standard	monetary	
models,	fixed	exchange	rates	can	provide	reasonable	insulation	against	severe	demand	
shocks	of	domestic	origin.	We	show	that,	according	to	the	same	model,	shocks	that	
originate	abroad,	as	arguably	was	the	case	for	the	Scandinavian	countries	in	the	Great	
Recession,	or	shocks	to	domestic	sovereign	risk	seem	to	be	best	served	by	a	regime	of	
flexible	exchange	rates.	We	conclude	that	the	classic	case	for	flexible	exchange	rates	
appears	to	be	alive	and	well.		
1 Introduction	
Going	back	at	least	to	Friedman	(1953),	the	classical	case	for	flexible	exchange	rates	
rests	on	two	arguments:	first,	exchange	rate	movements	are	an	efficient	way	to	adjust	
international	relative	prices	in	response	to	macroeconomic	shocks;	second,	with	
flexible	exchange	rates,	policymakers	are	free	to	choose	and	pursue	their	own	inflation	
target,	rather	than	shadowing	the	inflation	rate	abroad.	In	a	world	of	high	capital	
mobility,	a	country	foregoes	these	options	if,	instead,	it	commits	to	an	exchange-rate	
peg	or	joins	a	monetary	union.	These	arguments	have	been	debated	ever	since.	
Before	 the	 Great	 Recession,	 there	 were	 two	 main	 arguments	 against	 this	 case	 for	
flexible	 exchange	 rates.	 A	 first	 counterargument	 is	 that	 the	 exchange	 rate	may	 not	
help	correct	international	relative	prices.	Then,	perhaps,	there	is	no	great	social	loss	in	
giving	 up	 flexibility	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Devereux	 and	 Engel	 2003	 and	 Engel	 2011).	 A	
case	 in	 point	 is	 that	 of	 local	 currency	 pricing:	 if	 export	 prices	 are	 set	 in	 the	 export	
market’s	currency	 to	start	with,	a	nominal	depreciation	will	not	change	 international	
relative	prices.	Subsequent	literature	has	pointed	out,	however,	that	flexible	exchange	
rates	may	be	valuable	whether	or	not	 the	exchange	rate	aligns	 international	 relative	
prices	correctly.	Indeed,	a	flexible	rate	regime	allows	a	country	to	maintain	monetary	
autonomy,	 and	with	 that	 the	 ability	 to	 stabilize	 the	 economy	 using	monetary	 policy	
																																																																		
*	This	text	substantially	modifies	and	expands	our	previous	contribution	to	voxeu.org,	see	Corsetti,	Kuester	and	Müller	(2017b).	
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(see	 for	 example	 Corsetti	 2006,	 Duarte	 and	 Obstfeld,	 2008	 and,	 more	 recently,	
Schmitt-Grohé	and	Uribe,	2016).1		
The	second	counterargument	against	Friedman’s	case	for	flexible	exchange	rates	was	
practical	in	nature.	Namely,	there	seemed	to	be	little	benefit	left	from	choosing	one’s	
own	long-run	inflation	target	if	all	the	major	central	banks	had	already	agreed	on	
roughly	what	that	target	should	be,	and	had	adopted	inflation	targeting	(or	some	
variant	of	it)	as	their	monetary	framework.	If	all	central	banks	more	or	less	target	
inflation	in	some	range	around	2.5	per	cent	per	year,	why	would	‘one’s	preferred	rate’	
deviate,	especially	if	one	no	longer	had	to	insulate	against	foreign	inflationary	
developments?	Friedman’s	case	no	longer	seemed	relevant	for	the	industrialized	world	
today.	
The	Great	Recession	provided	yet	another	important	new	argument	against	flexible	
exchange	rates	that	is	far	from	theoretical	(brought	forward	by	Cook	and	Devereux,	
2016).	The	argument	rests	on	the	role	that	the	exchange	rate	regime	can	have	in	
anchoring	long-run	inflation	expectations	when	central	banks	find	themselves	
constrained	by	the	zero	lower	bound	(henceforth	ZLB)	on	interest	rates.	If	monetary	
authorities	have	a	currency	target,	the	argument	goes,	domestic	inflation	cannot	
deviate	too	much	from	foreign	inflation.	Even	in	response	to	large	adverse	domestic	
shocks,	therefore,	inflation	expectations	remain	anchored.	This	prevents	damaging	
deflationary	dynamics.	Under	a	floating	exchange	rate,	instead,	this	external	nominal	
anchor	does	not	exist.	Rather,	once	interest	rates	fall	to	the	ZLB,	falling	inflation	
expectations	can	exacerbate	the	recession	as	they	mean	that	real	interest	rates	remain	
too	high.		
This	argument	against	flexible	exchange	rates	suggests	that,	precisely	in	a	scenario	that	
involves	a	very	deep	recession,	flexible	exchange	rates	may	fail	to	provide	
macroeconomic	stabilization.	The	‘straight-jacket’	of	fixed-exchange	rate	regimes	may	
not	be	detrimental	after	all,	given	that	our	(advanced)	economies	seem	to	be	
vulnerable	to	the	ZLB	problem.2		
There	is	at	least	one	problem	with	this	line	of	thought,	however:	it	does	not	seem	to	
align	well	with	the	actual	experience	of	many	countries	during	the	crisis.	To	illustrate	
this,	we	produce	a	graph	which	shows	the	evolution	of	output	and	exchange	rates	vis-
à-vis	the	euro	in	four	Scandinavian	countries	during	the	Great	Recession.	
One	reason	for	choosing	the	four	Scandinavian	countries	to	illustrate	the	case	is	that	
they	have	comparable	income	and	cultural	and	institutional	commonalities.	Without	
downplaying	relevant	country-specific	factors	that	weigh	on	the	divergent	response	
reported	in	the	graph,	in	our	view	a	crucial	difference	was	made	by	the	exchange	rate	
arrangement.	Another	reason	is	that	the	Great	Recession	has	affected	the	US	and	
																																																																		
1	Most	importantly,	even	in	the	standard	workhorse	two	country,	two	good	monetary	model	of	the	open	economy,	under	the	
optimal	stabilization	policy,	exchange	rate	volatility	may	well	be	higher	when	export	prices	are	sticky	in	the	foreign	currency	
(hence	the	exchange	rate	cannot	correct	relative	prices	appropriately),	than	when	prices	are	sticky	in	the	currency	of	the	
producers	(Corsetti	et	al.	2010	pp.	906).	These	results	hold	independently	of	the	presence	of	nontraded	goods.	
2	Admittedly,	we	ourselves	may	have	played	a	role	in	starting	this	argument,	as	we	had	it	spelled	out	(but	also	critically	considered)	
in	our	paper	on	fiscal	policy	dating	from	2010	(and	published	as	Corsetti,	Kuester	and	Müller,	2013).		
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several	non-Scandinavian	countries	in	the	euro	area	more	directly	and	much	more	
deeply	than	the	Scandinavian	economies,	both	in	the	initial	phase	of	the	financial	crisis	
and,	quite	obviously,	in	the	later	years,	when	financial	and	macroeconomic	conditions	
worsened	in	the	euro	area.	Hence	our	four	countries	have	been	exposed	to	a	strong	
and	persistent	deflationary	environment	among	their	closest	economic	partners.	
	
Figure	1.	Output	and	the	exchange	rate	2007-2012	in	four	Scandinavian	countries	
Real	GDP	(left)	and	change	of	exchange	rate	(end	of	quarter	price	euro,	in	local	
currency).		
	
Note.	The	sample	period	is	2007Q4–2012Q4.	GDP	is	normalized	to	100	per	cent	in	
2007Q4,	and	the	exchange	rate	is	expressed	in	percentage	changes	relative	to	2007Q4.	
Sources:	OECD	Economic	Outlook	98	and	Bundesbank.	
	
Out	of	the	four	countries	in	the	graph,	two	have	given	up	exchange	rate	flexibility	vis-
à-vis	the	euro:	Finland	is	a	member	of	the	euro	area;	Denmark	operates	an	
independent	currency,	but	maintains	a	narrow	peg	to	the	euro.	The	other	two,	Sweden	
and	Norway,	pursue	inflation	targeting	and	have	flexible	exchange	rates.		
The	left	panel	of	the	figure	shows	a	sizeable	output	contraction	for	Finland	and	
Denmark,	the	countries	with	a	fixed	exchange	rate	to	the	euro,	and	for	Sweden	-	but	
not	for	Norway.	The	contraction	in	Finland	and	Denmark	is	persistent.	Sweden,	
instead,	recovers	fast.	This	is	noteworthy.	The	fact	that	the	recession	was	less	
persistent	in	countries	with	flexible	exchange	rates	suggests	that	the	monetary	regime	
may	be	an	important	factor.		
Indeed,	the	right	panel	shows	that	the	Norwegian	Krone	depreciated	sharply	against	
the	euro	during	the	first	year	of	the	crisis	–	something	you	may	expect	in	a	country	
that	does	not	face	a	constraint	on	its	monetary	policy	and	enjoys	room	to	maneuver	
regarding	policy	rates.	Crucially,	however,	flexible	exchange	rates	also	made	a	
difference	in	Sweden.	The	Swedish	Krona	depreciated	by	almost	as	much	as	the	
Norwegian	currency.	This	is	all	the	more	remarkable	since	Sweden	in	2009-10	was	
characterized	precisely	by	the	circumstances	that	have	made	some	of	the	recent	
literature	after	Cook	and	Devereux	(2016)	lean	towards	fixed	exchange	rates.	Namely,	
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in	Sweden,	policy	rates	were	at	what	was	then	considered	the	effective	lower	bound.	
Despite	the	limited	room	for	a	monetary	easing,	the	Swedish	Krona	depreciated.3	
With	all	the	necessary	caveats,	the	evidence	in	the	graph	provides	support	for	
Friedman’s	classic	dictum	in	favour	of	flexible	exchange	rates.	The	benefits	of	flexible	
exchange	rates	do	not	necessarily	seem	to	wither	in	a	Great	Recession	scenario.4	What	
proves	important	for	explaining	this,	is	that	the	Great	Recession	did	not	originate	in	
Scandinavia.	
2 Friedman	1953	in	a	global	Great	Recession	
In	a	recent	CEPR	discussion	paper	(Corsetti,	Kuester	and	Müller,	2017a),	we	provide	
the	theory.	We	start	from	the	same	models	and	many	of	the	same	premises	that	have	
been	brought	to	bear	against	flexible	exchange	rates.	What	we	unveil,	crucially,	is	the	
importance	of	where	the	recessionary	shock	originates	and/or	where	it	is	stronger:	in	
the	domestic	economy	or	abroad.	The	new	case	against	flexible	exchange	rates	(as	put	
forward	by	Cook	and	Devereux,	2016)	relies	on	the	domestic	economy	being	hit	by	a	
shock	that	is	stronger	at	home	than	abroad.	The	main	lesson	from	our	work,	instead,	is	
that,	from	the	vantage	points	of	small	open	economies,	flexible	exchange	rates	retain	
important	welfare	benefits	if	the	risk	is	a	rest-of-the-world	rather	than	a	local	
recessionary	shock.	While	the	arguments	are	not	exactly	the	same	as	the	ones	put	
forward	by	Friedman,	the	reasons	clearly	resonate	with	his	view	of	the	merits	of	
flexible	exchange	rates	as	a	cushion	against	foreign	price	drift.		
To	be	as	clear	as	possible,	we	are	not	questioning	the	validity	of	the	results	stressed	in	
the	existing	literature	–	these	and	our	results	are	all	nested	in	the	same	framework.	
Rather,	we	change	the	way	we	interpret	the	crisis.	Namely,	we	look	at	a	Great	
Recession	as	a	global	shock	that	propagates	asymmetrically	across	small	open	
economies,	rather	than	a	shock	that	affects	all	economies	symmetrically.	We	show	
new	results,	taking	seriously	the	fact	that	the	vast	majority	of	countries	in	the	world	
are	exposed	to	large	contractionary	impulses	from	abroad	–	a	risk	clearly	illustrated	by	
the	global	crisis,	and	arguably	still	quite	high	today.		
To	develop	our	analysis,	we	rely	on	the	most	standard	New-Open-Macroeconomics	
model	–	specified	in	such	a	way	that	we	can	derive	tractable	analytical	expressions	and	
thus	inspect	the	transmission	mechanism	in	a	transparent	fashion.	We	solve	the	model	
under	three	monetary	regimes:	an	unconstrained	float,	where	monetary	policy	can	
always	pursue	a	conventional	Taylor-type	rule	targeting	the	natural	rate	of	interest	
(the	‘Norway’	case	above);	a	float	where	monetary	policy	pursues	a	Taylor	rule	but	is	
unable	to	adjust	interest	rates	for	an	extended	period	(the	‘Sweden’	case);	and	a	
																																																																		
3	Some	readers	may	wonder	if	our	explanation	captures	the	Sweden	experience	in	its	entirety.	In	particular,	the	Swedish	
depreciation	may	in	part	have	been	driven	by	the	fact	that	some	Swedish	banks	had	large	exposures	in	a	few	Baltic	countries.	This	
would	make	the	evidence	more	consistent	with	our	model,	for	the	model	would	have	argued	that,	from	the	global	shock	alone,	
the	Swedish	Krona	should	have	depreciated	somewhat	less	than	the	Norwegian	Krone.	An	important	piece	of	evidence	for	the	
mechanism	in	our	model	is	the	rapid	recovery	of	Sweden	after	the	Great	Recession.		
4	In	addition	to	the	issues	discussed	in	this	text,	recent	literature	has	reassessed	exchange	rate	regimes	in	relation	to	the	
potentially	destabilizing	effects	of	large	capital	flows	(see,	for	example,	Obstfeld,	Ostry	and	Qureshi,	2017)	and/or	currency	wars	
(see,	for	example,	Caballero,	Farhi	and	Gourinchas,	2015).	In	both	cases,	the	issues	pertain	more	to	the	desirability	of	capital	
controls,	macro	pru	and	international	policy	cooperation	than	to	the	desirability	of	flexible	versus	fixed	exchange	rate	regimes.	
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credible	and	permanent	exchange-rate	peg	(the	case	of	‘Denmark	and	Finland’).	In	
other	words,	we	contrast	an	unconstrained	monetary	regime	to	two	constrained	
regimes.	One	is	constrained	by	a	currency	peg,	the	other	faces	the	ZLB.	
The	question	we	want	to	call	attention	to	is:	which	exchange	rate	regime	can	ensure	
better	macroeconomic	and	welfare	performance	vis-à-vis	severe	shocks?	That	is,	vis-à-
vis	the	possibility	of	a	strong	contractionary	shock	hitting	the	domestic	economy	more	
severely	than	abroad	(as	examined	by	the	literature),	and	vis-à-vis	a	Great	Recession	
that	originates	abroad	and	propagates	so	strongly	as	to	send	both	global	and	domestic	
monetary	policy	to	the	ZLB	constraint.	We	are	interested	in	understanding	which	
regime	provides	better	‘insulation’,	and	which	regime	could	be	best	complemented	by	
other	stabilization	policy,	especially	fiscal	policy.	
We	find	that	the	nature	of	macroeconomic	risk	associated	with	country-specific	and	
global	recessions	differs.	Therefore,	large	recessionary	demand	shocks	that	originate	at	
home	or	abroad	have	fundamentally	different	policy	implications.	
Flexible	exchange	rates	do	provide	a	great	deal	of	insulation	to	the	domestic	economy	
if	the	source	of	the	recessionary	shock	is	abroad.	If	foreign	interest	rates	become	
constrained	by	their	ZLB,	foreign	monetary	policy	cannot	effectively	cushion	an	
adverse	foreign	demand	shock.	In	this	case,	we	show	that	flexible	exchange	rates	are	
superior	to	fixed	exchange	rates,	even	if	domestic	monetary	policy	becomes	itself	
constrained	by	the	ZLB.	Note	that	this	lines	up	well	with	the	figures	shown	above.	
To	appreciate	the	reason,	it	is	useful	to	recall	in	detail	how	shocks	propagate	across	
borders.	With	a	large	persistent	demand	shock	in	the	foreign	economy,	and	if	the	
foreign	central	bank	cannot	fully	cushion	the	shock,	foreign	demand	falls	and	the	
foreign	price	level	falls	as	well.	The	demand	effect	of	the	shock,	by	assumption,	is	
asymmetric	–	it	is	stronger	abroad.	If	it	can,	the	home	central	bank	will	stabilize	
domestic	inflation	and	make	sure	that	the	foreign	shock	only	partially	transmits	to	
home	activity.	The	home	central	bank	does	so	by	reducing	nominal	rates	far	enough	so	
that	the	currency	depreciates.	Indeed,	it	makes	sure	that	the	currency	depreciates	
sufficiently	so	that	the	home	price	of	home-produced	goods	denoted	in	foreign	
currency	falls	by	more	than	foreign	prices	(the	home	terms	of	trade	depreciate).	This	
supports	demand	for	domestic	goods	and	the	domestic	price	level.	Depreciation	of	the	
nominal	exchange	rate	will	continue	for	as	long	as	the	foreign	deflationary	crawl	(the	
fall	in	the	foreign	price	level)	continues.		
A	key	novel	finding	from	our	work	is	that	some	of	this	stabilizing	effect	of	flexible	
exchange	rates	materializes	even	if	the	domestic	central	bank	cannot	reduce	the	
nominal	rate	by	as	much	as	it	would	like,	that	is,	if	it	reaches	the	ZLB.	A	flexible	
exchange	rate	still	works	to	partially	insulate	the	domestic	economy	from	an	adverse	
foreign	demand	shock.		
Why?	In	the	long	run,	purchasing	power	parity	constrains	the	dynamic	of	the	real	
exchange	rate:	because	foreign	prices	decline	more	strongly	than	domestic	prices	in	
response	to	the	shock	originating	abroad,	either	domestic	prices	have	to	continue	to	
fall	in	the	future	(which	the	domestic	central	bank	will	not	allow),	or	the	nominal	
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exchange	rate	has	to	depreciate	at	some	point.	Because	the	nominal	interest	rate	is	at	
the	ZLB	both	in	the	home	and	the	foreign	economy,	there	cannot	be	an	interest	rate	
differential	to	sustain	expectations	of	a	depreciation	over	time	(according	to	the	
uncovered	interest	parity	condition).5	A	weaker	future	exchange	rate	is	consistent	with	
financial	market	equilibrium	(absence	of	arbitrage)	today	only	if	the	currency	
immediately	depreciates	by	the	full	amount.	When	the	shock	hits,	then,	an	immediate	
depreciation	improves	price	competitiveness	(the	home	terms	of	trade	unambiguously	
depreciate).	This	stabilizes	demand	at	home,	albeit	not	quite	as	much	as	absent	the	
ZLB	constraint	on	domestic	monetary	policy.6	
Thus,	even	if	the	domestic	interest	rate	cannot	be	reduced	due	to	the	ZLB,	the	nominal	
exchange	rate	ensures	that	the	home	monetary	stance	is	relatively	more	expansionary,	
per	effect	of	the	exchange	rate	on	the	trade	in	goods.	Although	interest	rates	are	at	
the	ZLB	in	home	as	well	as	in	foreign,	the	home	country	experiences	lower	deflationary	
pressure.		
	
The	key	take	away	point	is	that	the	home	currency	depreciates	upfront	even	if	the	
home	authorities	are	unable	to	guarantee	monetary	stimulus	via	a	sufficiently	deep	cut	
in	policy	rates7	–	the	recent	experience	of	Sweden	arguably	being	the	leading	example.		
	
Here,	thus,	is	our	reformulation	of	‘the	classical	case	for	floating	rates	in	the	XXI	
century:’	on	the	one	hand,	upfront	depreciation	stabilizes	demand,	both	external	and	
domestic,	for	domestically	produced	goods;8	on	the	other	hand,	it	decouples	domestic	
prices	somewhat	from	any	deflationary	crawl,	a	crawl	which	may	haunt	the	rest	of	the	
world	in	a	global	recession.	In	other	words:	the	currency	depreciation	cushions	the	
shock.	As	in	Friedman’s	case	for	flexible	exchange	rates,	the	home	country	has	the	
ability	(if	not,	strictly	speaking,	the	choice)	to	maintain	its	inflation	closer	to	its	target,	
in	contrast	to	the	rest	of	the	world	that	is	mired	in	a	low-inflation	recession.	
Vis-à-vis	such	a	world-wide	recession,	indeed,	a	currency	peg	performs	quite	poorly.	
Not	only	would	a	country	give	up	the	benefits	of	stabilizing	current	demand	in	such	a	
regime,	keeping	the	domestic	economy	fully	exposed	to	the	drop	in	international	
demand.	But	also,	more	importantly,	a	credible	peg	would	anchor	domestic	prices	to	
the	foreign	price	level:	if	the	rest	of	the	world	suffers	a	deflationary	drift	(as	a	
consequence	of	being	in	a	Great	Recession	style	liquidity	trap),	the	domestic	economy	
would	be	bound	to	import	the	drift.	Much	worse:	with	the	nominal	exchange	rate	
fixed,	the	adjustment	of	the	terms	of	trade	depends	on	the	relative	adjustment	of	the	
price	levels	at	home	and	in	foreign	economy	only.	Foreign	prices	decline	more	(since	
																																																																		
5	Recent	work	has	shown	that,	during	the	global	crisis,	the	uncovered	interest	parity	(UIP)	puzzle	changes	sign.	Namely,	the	
coefficient	in	the	Fama	regression,	forecasting	depreciation	using	the	interest	rate	differential,	turns	from	negative	to	positive,	and	
is	quite	large	in	absolute	value.	Heuristically,	at	the	ZLB,	the	UIP	condition	is	violated	in	a	different	direction:	positive	interest	
differentials	forecast	excessive	depreciation	(Bussière	et	al.	2018).	
6	The	macroeconomic	outlook	is	considerably	worse	if	monetary	policy	is	at	the	ZLB.	Bodenstein	et	al.	(2017)	in	particular	show	
how	the	ZLB	problem	exacerbates	the	depth	and	persistence	of	adverse	foreign	shocks.		
7	This	is	not	the	case	if	monetary	policy	abroad	is	not	at	the	ZLB	–	that	is,	if	the	global	recessionary	shock	can	be	effectively	
stabilized,	so	that	there	is	no	“Great	Recession.”	In	this	case,	if	the	Home	economy	happens	to	hit	the	ZLB,	the	home	exchange	
rate	appreciates.	
8	This	is	indeed	quite	close	to	the	point	stressed	by	Friedman	1953,	although	his	analysis	ignores	the	ZLB	and	does	not	relate	the	
exchange	rate	to	the	monetary	stance	at	home	relative	to	the	one	abroad.	
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that	is	where	the	shock	hits	directly)	than	prices	in	home.	With	the	nominal	exchange	
rate	fixed,	the	home	terms	of	trade	appreciate,	making	domestically	produced	goods	
relatively	more	expensive	and	further	dampening	demand	for	these.	Fixed	exchange	
rates	also	mean	that	even	the	(small)	domestic	economy	will	see	the	domestic	price	
level	eventually	fall	as	much	as	foreign	prices	have	fallen.		
	
At	the	ZLB,	expectations	of	low	future	inflation	cause	the	real	interest	rate	to	rise	
endogenously	at	home,	above	the	foreign	level,	depressing	Home	consumption	
demand	further	still.	This	compounds	the	negative	effects	of	falling	external	demand.	
Last	but	not	least,	price	adjustment	takes	time.	This	means	that	the	recessionary	
effects	linger:	a	country	that	pegs	its	currency	gives	up	the	benefits	of	stabilizing	future	
demand	as	well	(compare	the	rapid	recovery	of	Sweden	in	the	graphs	to	Denmark	and	
Finland).	
	
The	importance	of	these	results	cannot	be	over-emphasized.	A	decade	after	the	
outburst	of	the	global	financial	crisis,	the	world	economy	remains	vulnerable	to	the	
risk	that	large	global	shocks	once	again	will	cause	a	new	Great	Recession.	This	is	a	
challenge	to	policymaking	in	small	open	economies,	which	by	their	very	openness	are	
particularly	vulnerable	to	external	developments.	In	light	of	our	findings,	in	such	a	
world,	the	case	for	flexible	exchange	rates	remains	alive	and	well:	per	se,	the	risk	of	
temporary	liquidity	traps	that	rule	out	efficient	monetary	stabilization	is	not	a	good	
enough	reason	to	overturn	Friedman’s	received	wisdom.9	
3 Exchange	rates	and	the	fiscal	and	monetary	policy	mix		
In	our	analysis,	the	key	lessons	from	the	Great	Recession	reinforce,	rather	than	
undermine,	the	case	for	floating	rates.	We	should	add	here	that	our	results	apply	to	
those	small	open	economies	that	can	count	on	stable	and	efficient	monetary	and	fiscal	
institutions	(for	example,	institutions	that	prevent	sovereign	risk	crises).	
To	frame	our	discussion	of	fiscal	policy,	however,	it	is	important	to	consider	the	‘other’	
case	in	our	analysis,	whereby	the	contractionary	shock	has	a	domestic	nature,	that	is,	it	
hits	asymmetrically	the	home	economy	without	directly	affecting	the	rest	of	the	world.	
For	this	case,	our	results	are	in	line	with	the	literature	(Cook	and	Devereux,	2016).	If	
the	shock	does	not	originate	in	the	rest	of	the	world,	but	in	the	small	open	economy,	
inflation-averse	foreign	monetary	authorities	can	keep	world	prices	stable.	The	main	
difference	with	our	previous	analysis	is,	precisely,	the	missing	response	of	world	prices.	
With	a	large	rest-of-the-world	demand	shock,	prices	in	the	rest	of	the	world	fall.	In	
response	to	a	domestic	shock	in	a	small	economy,	instead,	rest-of-the-world	prices	do	
not	move.	
In	this	context,	a	peg,	if	credible,	can	provide	a	commitment	to	reflate	the	domestic	
economy	toward	a	stable	world	price	level.	And	a	credible	and	stable	nominal	anchor	
is	beneficial	in	a	small	open	economy.	In	a	liquidity	trap	of	domestic	origin,	fixed	
exchange	rates	or,	even	better,	an	explicit	and	credible	exchange	rate	target,	may	help	
																																																																		
9	For	a	related	discussion	in	the	context	of	secular	stagnation,	see	Corsetti,	Mavroeidi,	Thwaites	and	Wolf	(2017).	
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–	a	point	that	resonates	with	Svensson’s	call	for	a	fool-proof	commitment	to	exchange	
rate	depreciation	(Svensson,	2003).	The	common	message	is	that,	absent	either	a	
currency	peg	or	a	credible	commitment	to	depreciation	(which	can	be	seen	as	a	
crawling	peg),	domestic	interest	rates	would	be	at	the	ZLB,	economic	activity	would	
decline,	and	domestic	prices	would	start	to	fall.		
However,	it	is	also	fair	to	observe	that,	precisely	in	situations	in	which	the	ZLB	problem	
would	emerge	amid	flexible	exchange	rates	in	the	domestic	economy	only	(say,	
because	of	the	large	domestic	demand	shocks	just	discussed),	there	could	also	be	a	
‘benign	coincidence:’	provided	that	public	debt	is	sustainable,	fiscal	policy	can	be	
expected	to	become	a	rather	effective	tool	of	stabilization.	A	strong	inflationary	impact	
of	fiscal	policy	magnifies	the	size	of	the	multiplier	at	the	ZLB.	In	fact,	it	can	be	shown	to	
exceed	unity	if	the	fiscal	stimulus	is	well	timed,	namely	if	higher	government	spending	
comes	online	precisely	while	the	ZLB	binds	(for	example,	Woodford,	2011	or	Farhi	
Werning,	2016).	Importantly,	this	is	so	independently	of	the	(domestic	or	external)	
origin	of	the	shock.	And	indeed,	in	a	recent	empirical	contribution	based	on	long	time	
series	for	the	US,	Ramey	and	Zubairy	(2017)	find	that	fiscal	multipliers	tend	to	be	larger	
if	interest	rates	are	low.	Similarly,	Miyamoto	et	al.	(2017)	provide	evidence	from	Japan	
that	multipliers	are	indeed	larger	at	the	ZLB.	
Conversely,	as	established	in	earlier	work	of	ours	(Corsetti,	Kuester	and	Müller,	2013),	
fiscal	policy	tends	to	be	less	effective	under	a	peg	because,	by	anchoring	long-run	
expectations	of	the	price	level	to	constant	world	prices,	an	exchange	rate	target	limits	
the	inflationary	impact	of	public	spending.	This	result	can	be	seen	as	one	more	reason	
to	hold	that	the	ZLB	problem	does	not	necessarily	weaken	the	case	for	flexible	
exchange	rates	in	small	open	economies.	However,	details	matter:	Erceg	and	Lindé	
(2012)	show	that	the	fiscal	multiplier	at	the	ZLB	may	be	smaller	than	one	and	also	
smaller	than	the	multiplier	under	the	peg	if	prices	adjust	slowly	(and	the	fiscal	stimulus	
is	not	well	timed).	
A	stable	fiscal	framework,	to	be	strengthened	in	good	times	in	view	of	future	
downturn	risk,	is	a	clear	prerequisite	for	good	stabilization	policies.	The	recourse	to	
fiscal	policy	may	nonetheless	be	limited	by	economic	or	institutional	constraints.	Here	
the	literature	has	argued	that	even	the	emergence	of	sovereign	and	country	risk	in	a	
downturn	–	complicating	stabilization	policy	and,	obviously,	detrimental	to	social	
welfare	–	does	not	appear	to	undermine	the	benefits	of	floating	rates	relative	to	a	
currency	peg	(see	Krugman,	2014,	and	previous	work	of	ours	–	Corsetti,	Kuester	and	
Müller,	2016).		
4 A	lesson	for	Sweden	and	other	relatively	small	open	economies	
To	bring	our	analysis	to	bear	on	possible	lessons	that	the	Great	Recession	may	have	
taught	us	concerning	currency	regimes,	it	is	tempting	to	make	qualified	references	to	
three	classics.		
Mundell	(1961)	has	forcefully	argued	that	the	optimal	exchange	rate	arrangement	
depends	on	how	synchronized	a	country’s	business	cycle	is	with	those	of	its	trading	
partners.	What	the	modern	literature	adds	to	this	is	the	emphasis	that	not	only	the	
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type	of	shock	that	hits	the	domestic	or	foreign	economy	matters,	but	also	the	size	and	
sign	of	the	shock.	With	large	enough	contractionary	shocks	in	part	of	the	monetary	
union,	the	ZLB	scenario	considered	in	the	current	text	may	arise	in	the	union	as	a	
whole,	independently	of	the	exchange	rate	regime.	Costs	and	benefits	of	a	currency	
area	need	to	be	re-discussed	in	light	of	this	possibility.		
Poole’s	(1970)	classic	paper	has	argued	that	the	choice	of	instruments	for	stabilization	
depends	on	the	source	and	transmission	of	shocks.	As	in	Poole,	also	in	our	analysis	the	
choice	between	a	float	or	a	peg	vis-à-vis	the	risk	of	a	ZLB	is	to	be	assessed	in	light	of	
the	implications	of	the	exchange-rate	regime	on	the	type	and	propagation	of	large	
contractionary	shocks.	The	analysis	highlights	that	a	credible	exchange	rate	target	can	
enhance	the	policymaker’s	ability	to	pursue	macroeconomic	stability	when	the	risk	of	
such	large	contractionary	shocks	is	mostly	of	domestic	origin.	The	main	benefit	of	this	
regime	consists	of	providing	a	nominal	anchor.	This	prevents	vicious	feedback	effects	
between	insufficient	demand	and	expectations	of	deflation.	A	floating	rate	is,	instead,	
more	efficient	when	there	is	a	risk	of	large	recessions	in	the	rest	of	the	world:	even	if	
the	domestic	policy	interest	rates	fall	to	their	ZLB	like	the	rates	abroad,	in	relative	
terms,	the	domestic	monetary	stance	is	expansionary:	the	currency	depreciates	in	real	
terms	and	deflationary	pressures	abate.	Exactly	the	opposite	would	occur	if	one	adopts	
a	currency	peg.		
Friedman	(1953),	the	third	classic	reference,	argued	that	domestic	monetary	
autonomy	insulates	a	country	against	foreign	price	level	drift.	Our	paper	emphasizes	
that	the	case	for	a	flexible	exchange	rate	applies	to	both	directions	of	foreign	price	
level	drift:	flexible	exchange	rates	allow	a	country	to	steer	clear	of	foreign	inflation	and	
foreign	deflationary	tendencies	(a	case	relevant	for	the	Great	Depression	and	the	
Great	Recession).	Both	directions	remain	relevant	today.		
In	this	paper,	we	have	argued	that,	in	a	global	recession,	flexible	exchange	rates	
remain	the	best	option	for	most	countries	to	insulate	their	economy	from	the	global	
slump,	even	if	their	own	monetary	policy	becomes	constrained	by	the	zero	lower	
bound.	The	experience	of	Sweden	in	the	Great	Recession	bears	this	out,	where	the	
Swedish	Krona	depreciated	in	the	Great	Recession,	providing	insulation	against	falling	
foreign	price	levels.		
Our	argument	is,	however,	not	the	only	one	standing	in	favour	of	exchange	rate	
flexibility.	Indeed,	at	the	opposite	end	of	the	case	for	flexible	exchange	rates	in	the	
Great	Recession,	one	can	point	to	the	experience	of	Switzerland.	The	Swiss	franc	
appreciated	vis-à-vis	the	euro,	reflecting	the	fact	that	Switzerland’s	status	as	a	financial	
`safe	haven’	has	led	its	currency	to	command	a	premium.	The	Swiss	authorities	have	
long	resisted	this	appreciation,	up	to	setting	record	negative	rates,	in	part	for	the	sake	
of	cost-competitiveness	of	Swiss	industries,	in	part	to	prevent	an	upward	trending	
currency	to	feed	further	capital	inflows.	While	`safe	haven’	considerations	are	arguably	
beyond	the	goals	and	scope	of	our	model,	the	economic	logic	is	simple.	Any	shock	that	
translates	into	a	stronger	currency	premium	adds	to	pressure	for	appreciation,	which	
can	be	resisted	only	by	lowering	policy	rates	further.	Once	rates	are	already	negative,	
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this	is	technically	challenging.	Most	importantly,	it	becomes	questionable	in	view	of	its	
implications	for	domestic	stabilization.10	
All	things	considered,	past	the	global	crisis	and	along	the	recovery	from	the	Great	
Recession,	the	case	for	flexible	exchange	rates	appears	to	be	alive	and	well.	
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